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Part A of the article introduces some key issues that will be dealt with in the article. Part B provides
an explanation of what trust is and discusses the importance of both intra-firm and inter-firm trust.
It also highlights how important trust is in financial markets in general. Part C illustrates the problems that can occur when there are breakdowns of trust in financial markets. It outlines some key developments in the run-up to the GFC. It then discusses three examples of breakdowns of trust (and their effects) in the run-up to the GFC. Part D brings together the different strands of the article to a conclusion.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
In order to carry out a meaningful analysis of trust in the financial markets it is important to first try to understand what trust means. It has been defined as "a reasonable belief that trusted persons will tell the truth, and keep their promises". 5 It has also been defined as "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community". 6 One definition of trust that is particularly relevant to the discussion of trust in financial markets is as "faith or confidence in the loyalty, strength, veracity...of a person or thing...without examination". 7 This definition is relevant to financial markets because it shows the link between trust and confidence. 8 The two words will not always be inter-changeable, but they are clearly linked, and references to collapses in confidence in financial markets are, to a large extent, akin to breakdowns of trust. A bank run may be seen as a stark illustration of a lack of trust in banks on the part of bank depositors. 5 that this trust gives them deeper human meaning. 15 They even go as far as to argue that when human beings are trusted they become encouraged to behave in a more trustworthy manner. 16 Progressive corporate law scholars are supported by the literature in psychology and sociology which argues that economic motivation is much more complex and encompasses much broader social habits and mores. 17 Fukuyama, for example, argues that commerce is about more than just money and profit-economic life is deeply embedded in social life, and it cannot be understood apart from the customs, morals and habits (culture) of the society in which it occurs.
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The debate between contractarians and progressives is, in essence, about the difference between an economic environment where contracts prevail (calculativeness) and one where social responsibility, ethics and fiduciary duties prevail (trust). This dichotomy does not just apply to the relationships within a firm, but can also apply to the firm's relationships with outsiders. It certainly applies to the relationships between trading entities in the financial markets, and raises questions such as whether we should see financial markets merely as contracts-based markets or whether markets have a social character, leading us to impose "other-regarding" duties, such as fiduciary duties on some financial market participants. This is however a debate that is beyond the scope of this article.
The role of 'trust' in commercial relationships (inter-firm trust)
The relevance of trust in commercial relationships has generated a significant amount of debate in economic and corporate law circles. On the one hand, law and economics scholars and conservative contractarians place less emphasis on trust and more emphasis on the 'rational economic man' 15 Mitchell, ibid, 872, 887-900 16 L E Mitchell, "The Importance of Being Trusted" (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 591, 599-600, 608-614 17 Fukuyama supra n 6, 18 18 Fukuyama supra n 6, 13 6 model that is associated with neo-classical economics, while on the other hand, socio-legal scholars place much greater emphasis on the role of trust.
Law and economics scholars generally view individuals as rational utility maximisers, that is, as autonomous individuals who make rational choices that maximise their satisfactions. 19 Economists like Oliver Williamson argue that if individuals are rational utility maximisers then they must take a calculative approach in their economic interactions or commercial transactions. 20 For them, trust is only used in personal relations. 21 They further argue that economic interactions are based on risk rather than trust, and that economic actors deal with risk using calculative approaches, such as contracts 22 and credible commitments, 23 to anticipate and allocate risk. It must be said here that rational utility maximising theory (or Rational Choice Theory, as it is popularly known) is not without its critics.
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Socio-legal scholarship offers a contrasting view of trust to that of law and economics scholarship.
Accounts of trust in terms of personal or social factors portray trust as having social, moral, ethical and cultural values rather than being based on rationality, self-interest or contract. 25 It has, however, been argued that this dichotomy is far too strongly drawn-the argument is that both calculative or self-interest accounts of trust, on the one hand, and the social notions of trust, on the other hand, neglect the role of institutional forms , including contract law, in sustaining and reproducing trust. 28 This is because both accounts of trust marginalise explanations based on institutional form. 29 Institutional trust (system trust) refers to the wider institutional and organisational framework within which inter-firm and personal relationships are formed. 30 The benefit of having institutions is that they allow firms to form and extend relationships with greater confidence and effect.
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It has also been argued that the building of trust through individual relationships and interorganisational links cannot be seen in isolation from the institutional framework within which contracts are made and performed. 32 Therefore the influence of the legal system needs to be understood in the context of other institutional factors, especially the activities of industry-level with other firms in the market. The GFC and the three examples will be discussed below.
The Global Financial Crisis
Some accounts of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) describe its origins as an asset price bubble in the US and UK housing markets, caused largely by deregulatory measures, benign macro-economic conditions, the reckless use of financial innovation, excessive liquidity and the easy availability of 11 credit. 46 Deregulatory measures have been highlighted as the catalyst in the build-up to the GFC.
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Excessive liquidity and misuse of financial innovation led to a significant deterioration of risk controls for the extension of credit, and subsequently to excessive lowering of underwriting standards for sub-prime mortgages. 48 This, along with market euphoria and irrational exuberance among investors, contributed to the real estate asset price bubble, which in large part triggered the financial crisis when it eventually burst.
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The misuse of financial innovation was reflected in the adoption by banks of the originate-todistribute business model, whereby banks re-package the loans they had advanced to customers 12 them to invest in only Triple A rated assets. 51 Unknown to these institutional investors the sheer complexity of these financial innovations, coupled with conflicts of interest affecting the major credit rating agencies, led the credit rating agencies to erroneously grant Triple A ratings to securities (ABS) that were less than worthy of such ratings.
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The asset price bubble that preceded the GFC has been described as "a supply-driven bubble, fuelled by the fact that mortgage loan originators came to realise that underwriters were willing to buy portfolios of mortgage loans for asset-backed securitisations without any serious investigation of the underlying collateral". 53 In effect, they 'trusted' the mortgage loan originators to only originate decent loans and therefore they did not bother to 'verify' the 'decency' of those loans. Such 'trust' is misplaced when the originators are not the ones who will bear the loss (costs) for not doing the proper screening of those to whom the mortgages have been granted, in effect generating a sort of moral hazard.
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The bursting of the asset price bubble led to huge numbers of defaults of sub-prime mortgages.
These sub-prime mortgages were part of the structured credit products that were developed under the originate-to-distribute model (RMBS and CDOs) and therefore the losses associated with the US Banks and insurance companies that invested heavily in these structured credit products suffered huge losses, and subsequently saw their market capitalisations fall dramatically as their share prices tumbled. The investment banks most heavily involved in the structured credit business actually collapsed. The losses and falls in market capitalisations were so severe that three of the five large US investment banks had to be rescued 57 or became insolvent, 58 while the two Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) that specialised in structured finance, 59 and the largest US insurance company, 60 all had to be bailed out, at substantial cost to the US taxpayer. The most notable of these companies that suffered financial difficulties is Lehman Brothers (hereinafter, Lehman), which, at that time, was the fourth largest US investment bank.
Lehman, like other investment banks used a highly leveraged business strategy. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had no authority to force investment banks to reduce their leverage, 61 and as a result, debt financing rose greatly in comparison to equity financing. The reliance on leverage financing became so widespread as a result partly of competitive pressure and the desire to gain strong market share. 62 Excessive leverage has been identified as one of a number 56 Ibid, 37-39 57 Bear Sterns, the smallest of the five large US investment banks faced severe liquidity problems and eventually had to be taken over by JP 14 of bank practices that contributed to the GFC. 63 The use of leverage is problematic because of its inverse relationship with liquidity-during the process of credit expansion the financial system becomes progressively illiquid. 64 Increasing leverage therefore makes a firm less financially robust, and when a highly leveraged firm sustains losses beyond a certain level this will sharply reduce its ability to pay its debts. 65 This is because it is more likely to be hit by a loss spiral, whereby a decline in the value of its assets erodes its net worth much faster than its gross worth because of its leverage and the limited amount that it can borrow falls. 66 The upshot of this is that when a firm is highly leveraged a collapse of trust or confidence by its creditors or investors can quickly take it from being illiquid to being insolvent.
The collapse of Lehman was particularly significant for a number of reasons. The most significant of these is that it proved to be the tipping point, in which a credit crunch and loss of confidence in some financial firms, transformed into a full-blown systemic financial crisis. 67 It is also significant because Lehman was the only financial firm that failed to secure privately or publicly funded financial assistance-it ultimately had to file for corporate bankruptcy. they are not rescued. This decision has, however, been criticised as incorrect because the collapse of Lehman had such a catastrophic effect on the global financial system.
(a) Lessons from the GFC
The GFC has shown how important liquidity is to the financial system. It has also shown that liquidity is largely dependent on trust. When confidence (trust) was eroded, liquidity disappeared. The erosion of confidence was signified by, for example, the collapse of confidence in RMBS and CDOs.
The use, by investment banks such as Lehman, of a high-risk, high-leverage business model requires the maintenance of the trust of all the counterparties that they deal with-it has been said that with such a business model "confidence is critical". 69 This is because counterparties put themselves in a vulnerable position in relation to the investment bank, based on the understanding that they will be able to reclaim all funds due to them under their counterparty agreements. A bank or investment bank that knowingly and recklessly puts itself in a position where it could potentially be unable to fulfil its financial obligations to its counterparties will lose the trust of its counterparties.
Another lesson to be drawn from the GFC is the fallibility of reputational or trust intermediaries such as gatekeepers. The gatekeepers (in this case the credit rating agencies (CRAs)) failed in their gatekeeping duties because they suffered from conflicts of interest. 72 The increased use of financial innovation (particularly structured finance) produced a change in the relationships between the ratings agencies and their clients-structured finance became the rating agencies' leading source of revenue, since rating securitised offerings generated much higher fees 73 and the increased competition in the CRA industry, when it changed from a duopoly (with Standard and Poors and Moodys) to one comprised of three CRAs (after the entrance of Fitch), made the competitors not more faithful to investors, but more dependent on their immediate clients, the issuers of the structured finance products. 74 In essence, the increased use of financial innovation, coupled with increased competition within the CRA industry, made the CRAs more beholden to the banks and other structured finance securities issuers.
The realisation that credit ratings were flawed led to the massive withdrawal of liquidity from the capital markets-investors were no longer willing to rely on ratings and, being unable to perform their own credit analyses, withdrew from a wide range of structured finance markets. 75 This clearly illustrates how trust is crucial in order for capital markets to function properly. The pre-eminence of gatekeepers was a result of the fact that they were trusted. As a result of their failure to carry out their gate-keeping role effectively they were no longer respected, and the debate on how best to regulate them has intensified. It has, for example, been proposed that rather than merely relying on their reputations as a check on gatekeepers, such as CRAs, we might have to do this through either civil action 76 or regulation. 77 Regardless of which of these two approaches is adopted it is clear that something needs to be done about the CRAs as it is no longer enough to simply rely on their reputations to be an effective check on how they behave and manage the conflicts of interest that they face.
The collapse of Northern Rock
The Rock, which had not foreseen the possibility of all of its funding markets closing simultaneously.
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Northern Rock was much more affected by the drying up of funds in the capital markets than other UK banks because it relied much more than the other UK banks on capital market funding rather than on retail deposit funding-its business strategy has been described as reckless and high-risk because it over-relied on short and medium-term wholesale funding from the capital markets and 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers
The collapse of Lehman was a very significant event in the GFC. Prior to its demise Lehman was the fourth largest investment bank in the US. 81 It used a high-risk, high leverage business model that was based on maintaining the confidence of its counterparties-if these counterparties were to lose confidence in Lehman and decline to roll over its daily funding in the short term repo markets then Lehman would be unable to fund itself and unable to continue its operations . 82 To this extent it operated a business model that relied on high levels of trust on the part of its counterparties.
In 2006 Lehman embarked on an aggressive growth strategy, taking on significantly greater risk and substantially increasing its leverage. 83 In doing so, it repeatedly exceeded its own internal risk limits and controls. 84 This reckless approach to leverage and risk management represents a failure by the firm's senior management to run the firm appropriately and in the best, long-term interests of its 79 
(a) Fraud and the issuing of Alt-A Loans
Lehman engaged in the business of non-prime loans; it was also heavily involved in the sub-prime loans business. 85 In addition, it was heavily involved in the Alt-A loans business and even had a subsidiary, Aurora LLC, which specialised in such mortgages. 86 Alt-A loans are not prime loans, but are supposed to be less risky than sub-prime loans. 87 These loans have been referred to as liar's loans. 88 Such loans increase adverse selection 89 and are allegedly 'criminogenic', because they encourage mortgage fraud by creating strong incentives to provide false information on loan applications. 90 This combination of adverse selection and mortgage fraud gives Alt-A loans a highly negative expected value and can easily lead to significant losses for the lender or underwriter.
91
In the short-term, writing large quantities of Alt-A loans creates the misleading impression that the company or firm is making significant profits, but such profits turn out, in the long run, to be illusory, since the company suffers huge losses in the future when the Alt-A loans begin to default. The shortterm appearance of profitability encourages the firms' managers to take a short-termist view since 85 Sub-prime loans are loans that do not qualify for purchase by the GSEs because they have been made to borrowers with low credit scores, bad credit histories or other forms of credit impairment 86 W K Black, "Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner", Statement to the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, April 20 2010, 5, 9 87 Alt-A loans are loans to borrowers with decent credit scores and credit histories but little or no documentary proof of their income 88 Black supra n 86, 5 89 Adverse selection is a situation where one party enters into a business or transaction with a second party that it would be better off not doing business or transacting with, because information asymmetries exist which make the second party an undesirable or unprofitable party to do business with-see Akerlof supra n 1 90 Black supra n 86, 5 91 Black supra n 86, 5 20 their remuneration is based on short-term profits. 92 It therefore becomes in the managers' interest to make (and to conceal the potential future losses from) such loans, even though making such loans is totally contrary to shareholders' long-term interests. In this way, Lehman activity in the Alt-A loan market illustrates the classic 'agency' problem, as illustrated by Berle and Means, whereby the separation of the ownership of the firm from its controllers leads to situations where the interests of the owners (shareholders) and the controllers (managers) diverge.
93
The so-called "agency problem" highlights the need for trust between the internal members of a firm. A large investment bank such as Lehman would have a diffused and diversified shareholder base, as well as several employees. This diverse body of shareholders entrust their property, the firm, to the management of the firm. In turn, the management is expected to run the firm in the best long term interests of the shareholders. The managers, as fiduciaries, must therefore put the longterm business interest of the firm ahead of its short-term profitability, and ought to manage the firm's risk profile accordingly. To the extent that the Lehman management failed to do this, it represents a failure of the trust placed in them by Lehman's shareholders.
(b) Lehman's Use of Repo 105 and Repo 108
Like many others in the banking and finance industry, Lehman required favourable ratings from the principal rating agencies in order to maintain investor and counterparty confidence, and to do this it had to report favourable net leverage numbers to maintain its ratings and confidence. 94 It therefore decided to paint a misleading picture of its financial condition -it used creative accounting to give the impression that it had a strong and robust liquidity pool, when in fact it did not. 95 This again represents a significant failure of trust. In so doing Lehman's senior management behaved in a way that had the potential to reduce the trust placed in Lehman by the firm's shareholders (intra-firm trust) and other investors and counterparties (inter-firm trust).
In amounted to what has been referred to as "non-disclosing disclosure", whereby "all the relevant information is provided, but in such a way that it is almost impossible to realise it might raise questions for the accounting treatment used". 105 It has even been argued that regulators and law enforcement officials prefer to tackle out-and-out frauds (which are easier to prosecute) than creative accounting (which is harder to prosecute), and that this affected the enforcement response to the corporate governance failures at Enron so it focused only on fraud and criminal prosecutions (because they are easier to secure convictions) thereby failing to provide a definitive response to 'gaming the system' through the use of creative accounting.
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The use of creative accounting, such as Repo 105 and 108, to conceal short-comings represents a failure of the trust that shareholders, employees (intra-firm trust) and creditors (inter-firm trust) placed in the firm's management. Such esoteric accounting treatments bear similarities to the sort of creative accounting that was at the heart of breaches of trust by the managers of Enron, and ultimately contributed to its downfall. The problem with such creative accounting is that it helps managements conceal short-comings in corporate performance, thus contributing to the downfall of companies. 107 It also raises serious issues regarding the reliability of financial reporting -it has been pointed out, for instance, that part of the outrage felt after the Enron collapse was simply the result of the fact that Enron used creative accounting to fundamentally mislead the market. 108 What this illustrates is that from the point of view of shareholders and investors, who place themselves in a vulnerable position by trusting the managers of the firm, the central concern is not whether the financial reports comply with the technical aspects of the law. It is, instead, whether or not the financial reports can be relied on, that is, the extent to which they can trust that such reports are an accurate portrayal of the firm's true position.
Goldman Sachs, Paulson hedge fund, ACA, IKB and ABN transactions
This episode involved the structuring of a CDO transaction known as ABACUS by Goldman Sachs, and its marketing and sale to the German corporate finance bank IKB and the Belgian-Dutch bank ABN Amro. Paulson, a hedge fund, developed an investment strategy based on the bearish view that certain mid-and-sub-prime Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) would experience credit events, that is, would default. 109 In essence, Paulson believed that synthetic CDOs whose reference assets consisted of certain Triple-B rated mid-and-subprime RMBS would experience significant 24 losses and become worthless. 110 Paulson then discussed the creation of a CDO with Goldman Sachs so as to allow Paulson to participate in selecting a portfolio of reference obligations and then effectively short selling the RMBS portfolio it helped to select.
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Goldman Sachs knew it would be difficult to get investors to invest in a CDO that a short investor, such as Paulson, had played a significant role in creating. This is because the short investor would have the incentive and the opportunity to fill the CDO with RMBS that were likely to default. It is highly unlikely that anyone would buy something that someone else had designed to fail. Goldman
Sachs also knew that the identification of an experienced and independent third party collateral manager as having selected the portfolio would facilitate the placement of the CDO (that is, encourage investors to invest in it). They knew that they needed to create the impression that an independent, neutral collateral manager had chosen the securities in the CDO, rather than someone who had effectively taken a bet against that very CDO.
Goldman Sachs therefore sought a collateral manager to play a role in the transaction proposed by
Paulson. 112 They approached the unit bond issuer, ACA Management LLC, to be the collateral manager, with the intention of using ACA's strong brand name and credibility to market the transaction to investors, who would be more willing to buy the products if ACA was involved, because of the value of ACA's brand -investors, in effect, trusted ACA's brand. Goldman Sachs was keenly aware of, and wanted to take advantage of, the trust those investors placed in ACA.
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Paulson's selection criteria for what went into the CDOs favoured RMBS that included a high percentage of adjustable rate mortgages, relatively low borrower FICO scores, and a high concentration of mortgages in states like Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada that had recently experienced high rates of home price appreciation but were likely to suffer price declines in the near future. Paulson allegedly loaded the CDO with securities that were likely to fail.
According to the SEC, Goldman Sachs' marketing materials for the synthetic CDO were false and misleading because they represented that ACA selected the reference portfolio while omitting any mention that Paulson, a party with economic interests adverse to CDO investors, played a significant role in the selection of the reference portfolio. 113 The prospectus and other marketing materials contained no mention of Paulson, its economic interests in the transaction, or its role in selecting the reference portfolio. 114 The investors were, in effect, misled into believing that the party selecting the portfolio had an "alignment of economic interest" with investors, when in actual fact the opposite was the case.
According to the SEC, Goldman Sachs also misled ACA into believing that Paulson was investing in the equity tranche of the synthetic CDO and therefore shared a 'long' interest 115 with CDO investors. 116 If ACA had been aware that Paulson was taking a 'short' position against the CDO, ACA would have been reluctant to allow Paulson to occupy an influential role in the selection of the reference portfolio, or ACA would probably not have agreed to take part in the transaction. 117 ACA had sought clarification in regard to Paulson's role in the transaction but Goldman Sachs and its 113 ibid, 11 114 ibid, 11-13 115 Long in the sense that it was investing in the equity tranche of the CDO and therefore had a favourable view of the prospects of the underlying assets that comprised the index that the CDO was based on 116 supra n 109, 13 117 supra n 109, 13 26 employee Fabrice Tourre allegedly misrepresented the facts to ACA. 118 It seems that ACA had not been careless or negligent-ACA's belief that Paulson was 'long' on the deal was reasonable, given the information provided to them by Goldman Sachs and Tourre. Reference in ACA's written approval memorandum to Paulson as "the hedge fund equity investor" confirms that ACA was under the misimpression that Paulson had a long position rather than a short position with respect to the CDO. 119 This misimpression is wholly attributable to the fact that Goldman Sachs and its employee, Tourre, allegedly lied to and misled ACA.
(a) The SEC Enforcement Action against Goldman Sachs and Fabrice Tourre
The SEC has taken a successful enforcement action against Goldman Sachs and Fabrice Tourre. The first claim made by the SEC was that Goldman Sachs and Tourre knowingly, recklessly or negligently misrepresented, in the ABACUS marketing material, that the reference portfolio was selected by ACA without disclosing Paulson's role in the selection and, in addition, misled ACA into believing that
Paulson was investing in the equity tranche of the CDO when in reality it was not. 120 This is contrary to section 17 of the Securities Act 1933. 121 The second claim was almost identical to the first one, but was based on section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 122 and SEC Rule 10b-5. 123 The distinction between the two claims is that the first claim merely requires the SEC to prove negligence on the part of the accused, a lower threshold for establishing culpability, while the second claim requires it to prove scienter, that is, the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. 124 Goldman Sachs agreed to settle the charges against it for $550 million. The settlement allowed Goldman Sachs to pay the fine without admitting or denying the allegations of fraud that had been levelled against it, 27 nor did it compel the resignation of any Goldman Sachs officers or employees. 125 Instead, Goldman
Sachs admitted that the incomplete and inadequate disclosures in its marketing materials were a mistake. 126 It has been argued that the SEC's use of section 17 allowed Goldman Sachs to admit to negligence rather than fraud. 127 Regardless of whether or not Goldman Sachs admitted to this, there is clearly a basis for an argument that its actions had a negative effect on trust in the financial markets.
(b) The Issue of Disclosure and Information Asymmetry
Disclosure is a key issue that underpinned the prosecution's case in regard to the above transaction.
The inadequate disclosure of information can sometimes constitute a significant market failure that has often created a good justification for imposing enhanced regulation. 128 Disclosure is a key weapon in the battle against fraud and market abuse, and is often the cornerstone of investor protection regimes in securities markets. 129 The US New Deal securities statutes, for example, were enacted after the Great Depression largely to address the glaring need for adequate disclosure in the US securities markets. 130 If the ABACUS transaction had been carried out on a registered Exchange, Goldman Sachs would have had to disclose information that ACA, IKB and ABN were not given. It has, however, been argued that although the ABACUS transaction was a specially structured deal, it 125 E Pekarek and C Lufrano, The Goldman Sachs The counter-argument that could be put forward by Goldman Sachs and its supporters is one based on libertarian free market ideology. The argument is that ACA and the investors, IKB and ABN, did not need disclosure or any other regulatory protection beyond their remedies for breach of contract since they were professional institutional investors or market counterparties, who ought to have properly examined the contents of ABACUS before investing in or becoming affiliated with ABACUS. 132 Market counterparties are clients who are able to look after their own interests, thus not requiring the protection afforded by regulatory rules. 133 There is some support for this view in UK law, where the courts are reluctant to interfere in transactions between commercial organisations dealing with each other as principals. 134 In this sense trust is not seen as being important to professional or institutional investors who can reasonably be expected to undertake proper due diligence rather than rely on trust.
The argument, by Goldman Sachs and its supporters, that ACA, IKB and ABN were all professional institutional investors is, however, a weak one. US courts have held that the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts do not distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, since both are entitled to the protection afforded by disclosure and anti-fraud laws. 135 Disclosure of ethical reasons. 137 The failure of Goldman Sachs to provide the requisite information for the ABACUS investors ultimately led to those investors being misled. 138 Misleading investors in this way seriously undermines the possibility that cooperation and trust can enhance business performance or promote dynamic efficiency within markets. This shows that even sophisticated professional investors may have to rely on trust since there are limits to the amount of due diligence that they can perform, and trust therefore has a role to play in filling information gaps and helping even the most sophisticated professional investors to reduce their information-gathering and informationprocessing costs. It further strengthens the argument that trust can encourage more mutually beneficial behaviour.
(c) The Issue of Conflict of Interest
Goldman Sachs has been described as helping some clients to make huge bets against the very same mortgage-backed assets that it was selling to other clients, 139 and as having failed to disclose this conflict of interest to investors. 140 Conflicts of interest are problematic for both economic 141 and ethical reasons. 142 The Wall Street analyst case, where Merrill Lynch was punished for its use of implicit promises of favourable ratings from its research analysts in exchange for investment banking business such as IPO underwriting, provides a good example of disciplinary action taken against a firm for failing to properly manage conflicts of interest. 143 The former Attorney-General of New York,
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Eliot Spitzer, took out a successful action against Merrill Lynch for its failure to properly manage conflicts of interest when its investment bank put pressure on its research analysts to publicly recommend stocks for investors to purchase even though privately the analysts knew that these stocks were of poor quality. 144 In addition, a subsequent joint investigation by Spitzer, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and North American Securities Administrators Administration (NASAA) into research analysts and their conflicts of interest, resulted in a settlement in which ten Wall Street firms and two individuals agreed to pay a total of approximately $1.4 billion and to improve their policies and procedures so as to avoid conflicts of interest in the future. 145 The comment by Spitzer that Merrill Lynch's behaviour was "a shocking betrayal of trust by one of Wall Street's most trusted names" provides strong support for the argument that failing to properly manage conflicts of interest can have a detrimental effect on trust in the financial markets.
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Goldman Sachs' defence to the accusation that it failed to manage conflicts of interest properly is rooted in the libertarian free market view that there will inevitably be winners and losers in a free market. Goldman Sachs defiantly countered accusations of conflict of interest or betting against its clients, arguing that although it "went short" on the housing market while simultaneously continuing to trade mortgage-backed securities to its clients, this was not wrong, and was merely a case of various sophisticated investors simply taking different views. 147 There is some support for this viewthe arm of Goldman Sachs that sold mortgage-backed securities was not a financial advisory business, counselling clients on what might be in their best interests. Instead, it is arguably a 31 market-making division where customers come forward with things they want to buy or sell and Goldman Sachs shops around to find a party willing to be on the other side of the deal. 148 The whole point of markets is that buyers are taking the opposite view from sellers-there would not be any sellers if everyone expected a security to only increase in value.
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Although Goldman Sachs would take the view that it is not unlawful to bet against your clients, such an action is arguably inherently unfair and unethical. Indeed, other industry insiders have condemned such actions -it has been described as a "reputation issue" that should not have arisen if Goldman Sachs held on to its "moral compass". 150 This contributes to the idea that failing to behave morally or ethically is tantamount to a failure of trust, even where it is not technically a breach of the law. A competitor of Goldman Sachs had actually declined to take part in such a transaction because it did not think it should "sell deals that someone was shorting on the other side". 151 The fact that even traders and industry professionals who knew and understood the nature of the product acknowledged that such behaviour was immoral and unethical shows that such action would be a failure of trust that would tarnish the reputations of those who acted in this way.
(d) Trust
In many ways, the behaviour of Goldman Sachs with regard to the ABACUS transaction constitutes a breach of popular conceptions of trust. It has been observed that properly-functioning markets are built on trust, transparency, confidence and certainty, and that these key foundations are severely eroded when prominent financial institutions engage in abuses of trust or otherwise act immorally Bloomberg news survey also showed that the public no longer trusted Goldman Sachs and that its reputation had been tarnished by the ABACUS scandal. 155 This loss in public trust may drive away current and future clients, as has already been evidenced by the decision of some European nations to stop doing business with Goldman Sachs in the light of its role in the recent Greek sovereign debt crisis. 156 In sum, the ABACUS transaction demonstrates that although trust might not be as critical to professional or institutional investors as it is for retail investors, it nevertheless has a significant role to play in regulating the manner in which such professional or institutional investors interact with one another in the financial markets.
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D. CONCLUSION
This article has looked at trust and its significance in commercial relationships. In particular it has examined the important role that trust plays in intra-firm and inter-firm relationships, as well as why it is necessary to have trust in financial markets. It has also looked at ethical issues where corporate or commercial conduct might not constitute a breach of the law, but nevertheless constitutes a breach of popular notions or conceptions of trust. In so doing, it highlights the potential that trust has to shape regulatory policy for financial markets.
It is clear that important components of financial markets, such as liquidity and investor confidence, are to a large extent based on trust. To this extent, financial markets will eventually be weakened if trust is eroded within them. The failure of Northern Rock, during the GFC, serves as a stark illustration of why trust is important in financial markets. The erosion of trust in the inter-bank and capital markets made it difficult for Northern Rock to raise finance through the sale of ABCP. In addition, the depositor run that Northern Rock suffered shows that trust is important in retail banking in much the same way as it is important in wholesale capital markets.
At the intra-firm level, agency problems and creative accounting remain fundamental issues that must be addressed in order to promote trust. The use of esoteric accounting treatments is problematic because it helps managements conceal important information from shareholders, such as shortcomings in corporate performance. Such accounting treatments therefore exacerbate the agency problem rather than reduce it. The use of esoteric accounting treatments is also problematic because it allows managements to operate on the fringes of the law rather than firmly within its boundaries. Creative accounting is also problematic because it reduces trust once it has been discovered. The collapse of Lehman highlighted the need to address these fundamental issues.
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Measures that can reduce creative accounting include a more robust, principles-based approach to financial and accounting regulation on one hand, and, on the other hand, a shift of focus from technical compliance to substantive compliance with the intent or the objectives of the accounting laws or principles. 157 It is therefore important that such measures are taken in order to tackle the problem of creative accounting.
At the inter-firm level, the ABACUS transaction carried out by Goldman Sachs illustrates the need for market participants to act conscientiously. Although markets operate on the basis that market participants are free to take divergent views on the desirability of their investments the market has to guarantee that they will be able to make their decisions based on all of the relevant information.
Commercial or business relationships are underpinned by contractual relationships which involve or ought to involve overarching obligations of good faith, solidarity, role integrity and mutuality. 158 The integrity of markets therefore depends, to a large extent, on market participants being truthful, open and honest with each other. The deliberate withholding, or non-disclosure, of essential information that is required by market participants to make informed decisions, will be a failure of trust that undermines the integrity of markets. 35 therefore highlight the fact that law and regulatory policy will have to place greater emphasis on complying with the spirit or intent of the law or rules in addition to complying with the wording of the law or the rules. They also highlight the fact that ethics and integrity have a greater role to play in financial markets and should be used to complement the law and the regulatory rules. Trust can therefore play a significant role in regulatory policy because it can be used to emphasize the importance not just of complying with laws but also of complying with ethical standards even if such standards have not been fully defined in the law.
Corporate law theory clearly needs to be enriched by resort to a greater range of concepts to help us to provide a more nuanced understanding of corporations and the financial markets in which they operate. The concept of trust is clearly a useful one in this regard. This article has argued that the concept of trust provides us with essential insights into conduct and transactions that are to be found in financial markets. More applications of this concept and similarly important ideas which explain market conduct by individual investors and corporations are appropriate.
